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ABSTRACT 
Currently, there exists no full definition of persistent surveillance in joint doctrine 
that allows a clear distinction between persistent and non-persistent collection 
requirements for collection managers to properly resource surveillance assets. The Joint 
Forces Command (JFCOM) Joint Concept Development & Experimentation Directorate 
(J9) attempts to alleviate this shortfall by proposing a definition: “Persistent Surveillance: 
an operationally focused surveillance approach that uses a full range of strategic, 
operational and tactical collection methods to dwell on and revisit a target. Persistent 
surveillance contributes to the detection and recognition of meaningful changes in an 
adversary’s activities that support planning and executing preemptive actions to prevent 
likely adversary courses of action.” 
The issue with this definition, as with all current definitions, is the lack of 
precision in defining what circumstances warrant the use of persistent surveillance. In 
addition, currently there are no quantifying metrics to determine effectiveness of 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) collection for the use of the 
persistent surveillance concept (i.e., metrics to show the duration an asset loiters over a 
target area and the success rate of meeting  mission objectives during this time). Without 
a clear and distinct definition, and metrics, the concept of allocating assets for collection 
managers to perform persistent surveillance becomes ambiguous.  This thesis is to 
determine key conditions for allocating the use of persistent surveillance through 
historical analysis of the use of persistent surveillance between the concept’s introduction 
in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the evolution following the 2006 
QDR, when the concept of persistent surveillance was actually declared an operational 
capability that was vital to the mission in Iraq. This thesis will perform a historical case 
study on the evolution of persistent surveillance in U.S. Central Command in order to 
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A. PERSISTENT SURVEILLANCE 
The eighteenth-century utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham envisioned the 
perfect environment for watching over convicts using persistent surveillance. The design 
was known as the “panopticon,” and it allowed constant surveillance by prison guards 
unbeknownst to inmates.1 The panopticon design placed prisoners in cells around a 
central observation tower. From the tower, convicts could be watched, but could not see 
who was watching. The architectural design of using surveillance as a threat, Bentham 
believed, was enough to compel prisoners to behave to the point that actual observation 
would most likely be unnecessary. Bentham also believed that the concept of persistent 
surveillance would not only grant unrestrained power to observe whenever desired, but 
would indirectly lead to the power to control actual behavior of those being watched.  
The ideology behind panopticons was not fully appreciated during Bentham’s 
time. Ironically, two centuries later a parallel ideology of persistent surveillance is 
eagerly being sought by military strategists. Information gained through the use of 
persistent surveillance is believed essential for U.S. forces against adversarial challenges 
faced in twenty-first-century warfare.  
B. THE PROBLEM 
In March of 2007, the Joint Integrating Concept (JIC) for Intelligence, Persistent 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Planning and Direction identified future 
military operations in the 2014-2026 timeframe: missions that would “require persistence 
to find, identify, track and determine intent of elusive adversary targets.”2  The JIC 
indicated that increases in sophisticated denial and deception techniques by adversaries 
were expected to rise in the future, along with adversaries taking advantage of optimizing 
                                                 
1 Jeremy Bentham, Panopticon (Preface), in Miran Bozovic (ed.), The Panopticon Writings, (London: 
Verso, 1995), 29–95. 
2 Department of Defense, Intelligence, Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: 
Planning and Direction JIC, ver. 1.0, March 29, 2005, 3, http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/jic.htm.  
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complex environments against U.S. forces. The JIC’s identification of the future threat 
codified Combatant Commander’s (COCOM) on-going concerns for the need of 
increased persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) to fill 
capability gaps in their Integrated Priority Lists (IPL).3   
Despite identification of future threats and the call from warfighting COCOMs to 
address the gap with more increased persistent ISR as a solution, the Department of 
Defense as a whole has yet to provide sufficient metrics for evaluating either the 
effectiveness of ISR missions or warfighters’ needs for the increased ISR assets.4 
Statistical research of past military operations to justify the call for increased persistent 
ISR does not exist. “DOD currently assesses its ISR missions with limited quantitative 
metrics such as the number of targets planned versus the number collected against.”5 
Although the DoD acknowledges the issue, the department continues to take the risk of 
perpetuating the problem by fielding “more and more collection capabilities with little 
regard for how they "plug-in" to the ISR Enterprise as a whole.”6  The Defense ISR 
Enterprise is made up of globally distributed human and technological systems, 
combining deployed forces, fixed overseas locations, and Continental U.S. operations.7 
Without developing metrics and systematically gathering feedback that enables it 




                                                 
3 Department of Defense, Intelligence, Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: 
Planning and Direction JIC, ver. 1.0, March 29, 2005, 3, http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/jic.htm. 
4 Government Accounting Office,  Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance: Preliminary 
Observations on DOD’s Approach to Managing Requirements for New Systems, Existing Assets, and 
Systems Development (Washington, DC, 2007), 14; at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07596t.pdf. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Department of Defense, Intelligence, Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: 
Planning and Direction JIC, ver. 1.0, March 29, 2005,  3, http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/jic.htm. 
7 Definition of ISR Enterprise derived from statement of John Landon, representative for the 
Undersecretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, made before the U.S. House of 
Representatives Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces Committee on Armed Services and the 
Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence, October 5, 2005, located at: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/congress/2005_hr/051020-landon.pdf. 
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DoD is not in a position to validate the true demand for ISR assets, determine whether it 
is allocating and tasking its ISR assets in the most effective manner, or acquire new 
systems that best support warfighting needs.8 
Uncovering the conditions under which persistent surveillance is used is 
important for defense decision makers and planners. A clear definition of concept 
utilization allows for better system acquisition, test and evaluation, development of 
doctrine, and training of concept and asset usage which in turn can provide the greatest 
support to the warfighter.  
Using a systems approach, the dynamics of an unclear and undefined concept of 
persistent surveillance can be better articulated. By drawing a behavior-over-time graph,9 
based on conditions of key concepts, a better understanding of the current concerns 
surrounding the issue can be understood. Although the future aspect of the graph is based 
on speculation, and any projection of the future could be wrong, the speculation 
nonetheless allows discussions that may otherwise never get surfaced.  
The behavior-over-time graph below predicts the relationship among four 
behavioral concepts involved in the evolution of persistent surveillance as first conveyed 
in the 1998 DoD Annual Report to the President and Congress.10  The four concepts are 
allocation of persistent surveillance assets; the concentration of target collections; the 
intensity of surveillance; and the amount of actionable intelligence acquired. They are 
measured against three timeframes (past, present and future).  
                                                 
8 Government Accounting Office,  Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance: Preliminary 
Observations on DOD’s Approach to Managing Requirements for New Systems, Existing Assets, and 
Systems Development (Washington, DC, 2007), 14; at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07596t.pdf. 
9 Behavior-over-time graphs take key variables as an important first step toward articulating the 
current understanding of a dynamic system. By graphing speculated future behavior of each variable, the 
objective is to test assumptions and uncover inconsistencies that may otherwise never get surfaced. 
Information derived from Guidelines for Drawing Casual Loop Diagrems, written by Daniel H. Kim, 
available on The Systems Thinker Web site at: http://thesystemsthinker.com/tstgdlines.html. 
10 Text combines the concepts taken from “Chapter 8:Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance” of DoD 1998 Annual Report to the President 
and the Congress, located on Department of Defense Web site at 
http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr98/chap8.html#top. 
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Using the 1998 DoD Annual Report to the President and Congress as a baseline, 
the evolution of the value of surveillance assets is graphed. Using subsequent reports, in 
particular the 2001 and 2006 QDR, this thesis speculates that military operations will 
continue to increase demand for persistent surveillance assets, but questions whether or 
not such demands are actually warranted. If this prediction holds true, an increased 
reliance on surveillance assets will be seen as a significant aspect of the 2010 QDR, and 
as such, the request should be scrutinized by Congress.  
This thesis argues that without a clear definition of what or how the persistent 
surveillance concept is to be used, the demand for more assets and the continued reliance 
by the force on the products of the assets have a higher propensity of being mismanaged 
and underutilized. The lack of a clear vision and end state in the use of increased 
surveillance assets leaves DoD decision makers no basis for prioritizing investments, 
assessing progress in achieving strategic goals or identifying where further investment in 
capabilities may no longer be warranted.11 
The request for more persistent surveillance has evolved from gaining more 
actionable intelligence on a specific target set to being a resource in providing situational 
awareness for broader coverage of areas for tactical missions. By expanding the target 
search from one that is specific (i.e., named target) to one that is broad (i.e., using 
surveillance in fighting warfare ideology such as defeating improvised explosion devices 
(IEDs)) may minimize the efficiency of use of the assets operational intent. This thesis 
asserts that as the use of persistent surveillance asset allocations continues to increase, the 
coverage area will broaden. Where the coverage area is broadened, the concentration on a 
target area becomes less focused. As the target area becomes less focused, the 
surveillance intensity decreases. A summary of such speculation is depicted in the 
behavior-over-time graph (Figure 1). This graph illustrates the speculation of how the  
 
                                                 
11 Noted in a Government Accountability Office report ro the Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, 
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives entitled “Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance: DoD Can Better Assess and Integrate ISR Capabilities and Oversee Development of 
Future ISR Requirements,” GAO–08–374, March 28, 2008, available at: 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-374. 
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identified factors may progress into the future, for better or for worse. Such speculation 
was validated through historical analysis of the persistent surveillance concept used in 
Iraq between 2003 and 2007. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Behavior-Over-Time Graph of Persistent Surveillance 
 
These relationships are better understood in the causal loop diagram shown in 
Figure 2. Causal loop diagrams are constructed to aid in identifying the causal 
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relationship between different aspects within a system.12 The relationship within the 
system is labeled with (S) or (O) to indicate a positive or negative causal effect.  An (S) 
means that change in the concept variable leads to change in the same direction (increase 
or decrease) in the variable it is being related to. For example, if the definition of 
persistent surveillance is ambiguous, then this causes an increase in ambiguity in 
justification for using the concept. Likewise, the relationships identified with an “O” 
signify an opposite, or negative, effect. For example, as ambiguity in justification for 
using persistent surveillance increases, the concentration on target collection decreases. 
This is an opposite, or negative, relationship.  
The causal loop diagram in Figure 2 reveals a vicious cycle. The diagram shows 
that greater ambiguity in the definition of persistent surveillance leads to greater 
ambiguity in the justification for the concept’s use.  Where there is greater ambiguity in 
the concept’s use, there is less concentration on target collections. As target collections 
are less concentrated, so is the level of surveillance intensity. When surveillance intensity 
is decreased, there is an increase of information but a decrease in actionable intelligence 
acquired. The lack of actionable intelligence by the surveillance assets perpetuates the 
notion that there is a lack of available surveillance assets to accomplish the mission, thus 
an increase in assets in needed in order to resolve the problem.  
There is hope in escaping this vicious cycle. The first step is to clearly define how 
the persistent surveillance concept should be used and the second step is to explore under 
what conditions persistent surveillance has been effectively used in the past.  
                                                 
12 Information derived from Guidelines for Drawing Casual Loop Diagrems, written by Daniel H. 
Kim, available on The Systems Thinker Web site at: http://thesystemsthinker.com/tstgdlines.html. 
 7
 
Figure 2.   Casual Loop Diagram: Why is Persistent Surveillance Important? 
 
1) Starting with a definition. The definitions of persistent surveillance alone, 
in military circles, are ambiguous and inconsistent in the realms of intent. Ambiguous 
definitions can lead to higher probabilities of increased mismanagement of resources: 
time, money and manpower. Without a singular, concise explanation to justify the 
requirement for persistent surveillance, collection platforms and resource allocation 
continue to be trapped in a vicious cycle of mismanagement. Although several definitions 
currently exist, the proposed JFCOM/J9 definition is the most consistent for how the 
concept is utilized. The organization defines persistent surveillance as: 
an operationally focused surveillance approach that uses a full range of 
strategic, operational and tactical collection methods to dwell on and 
revisit a target. Persistent surveillance contributes to the detection and 
recognition of meaningful changes in an adversary’s activities that support 
planning and executing preemptive actions to prevent likely adversary 
courses of action.13 
                                                 
13 JFCOM/J9 definition provided by Post-JIPS Conference, Suffolk, VA, May 26, 2008. 
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2) Explore when persistence has been used in the past and the conditions 
under which it is more effective. Only after understanding how persistent surveillance has 
been employed and with what level of effectiveness is it possible to plan for more 
efficient and effective use in the future.  
This thesis provides a historical case study of the use of the concept of persistent 
surveillance in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of operations from 2003–
2007.  This time period was chosen because it illustrates the evolution of this concept 
from the first years of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), soon after persistent surveillance 
was introduced as an operational goal in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 
to the period of 2006–2007, after the concept had been declared a requirement for 
defeating terrorist networks in the 2006 QDR.   
Examples of persistent surveillance taken from missions executed by CENTCOM 
during this period show how the concept shifted from a conventional to an irregular 
warfare resource, and between the strategic and tactical levels of operation. The events 
chosen to show this include: the rescue of Army POW Private Jessica Lynch (2003), the 
capture of former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein (2003), operations in Fallujah (2004), 
the capture of insurgent leader Abu Masab al-Zarqawi (2006), the joint effort to counter 
the IED threat through the creation of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat 
Organization (JIEDDO) (2006), and the Army counter-IED effort led by a task force 
named, Task Force Observe, Detect, Identify and Neutralize (TF ODIN). The 
methodology as to how and why these events were chosen for the thesis will be discussed 
in Chapter III. 
As will be discussed in Chapter IV, four examples were chosen to represent the 
evolution of persistent surveillance for the 2003 to 2005 time period.  An additional three 
examples from 2006 to 2007 were used to show the further evolution of persistent 
surveillance.  Chapter five then analyzes those examples to determine whether the 
persistent surveillance was effective or not.  A graphical representation of how each 
example fits into its respective area (i.e., Jessica Lynch was an example from the 2003 to 
2005 time that was effective) is shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.   Research Design of Cases Chosen to Analyze the Use of Persistent 
Surveillance 
 
Chapter VI concludes the thesis and warns that the continued use of multiple 
interpretations of persistent surveillance will have serious implications for the acquisition 
and allocation of asset prioritization for decision makers and planners into the foreseeable 
future. An accurate definition for persistence surveillance in preparation for the 2010 
QDR is more important than ever. 
Due to the nature of classified operations and the disclosure of classified military 
capabilities, these examples are limited in scope to historic accounts based on 
unclassified evidence obtained from open-source information of real-world intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR).  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. PERSISTENT SURVEILLANCE: THE KEY TO SUCCESS IN FUTURE 
WARFARE 
The United States has proudly held the reputation as the “single remaining 
military superpower” in the modern world.14 Made up of roughly 2.6 million active and 
reserve members, the force operates on an annual budget of approximately $700 billion 
with a supporting budget that supplies the largest inventory of advanced war-fighting 
equipment in the world.15 Whereas innovative approaches using technologically 
advanced systems, such as strategic lift and GPS guided precision munitions, have 
allowed the U.S. to achieve strategic dominance, they have also fostered a culture of 
dependency on technology to provide answers to threats being faced in the battlespace. 
The emerging use of persistent surveillance, as an answer to thwarting the insurgent 
stronghold in Iraq and Afghanistan today is a perfect illustration of this.  
Although the U.S. emerged as the world’s military super power at the end of the 
Cold War, its military has an unsuccessful track record in achieving an offensive 
dominance in an asymmetric warfare environment. The increasing use of the persistent 
surveillance concept by U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan has been said to be in 
response to the call from the warfighter as one of the main resources missing in order to 
successfully defeat the insurgency.  
And when America's conventional military superiority fails “to deliver quick, 
cheap, and decisive success,” as it had failed to do in Vietnam, all levels of the 
government scramble to find the answers before the American public becomes  
 
                                                 
14 Craig Eisendrath and Tom Harkin, National Insecurity: U.S. Intelligence After the Cold War 
(Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2000), 181. 
15 Statistical data retrieved from the Bureau of Labor Statistics: Occupational Outlook Handbook, 
2008–2009 Edition, on the number of active and reserve members in the U.S. armed services, available at: 
http://www.bls.gov/OCO/ocos249.htm, accessed on November 20, 2009. 
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“politically demoralized.”16 For military decision makers and planners this means an 
increase in budgetary requests for the production of “silver bullet” answers, such as that 
of persistent surveillance. 
The events of September 11, 2001, and the military operations that ensued in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) emphasized the 
value of intelligence and the need for operational reform. In a statement before the Senate 
Armed Services Committee, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Dr. Stephen 
Cambone explained the need for organizational transformation in the Intelligence 
Community: 
ISR organization and doctrine—weather in support of political or military 
leaders—has not been systematically revised for two generations. ISR 
activities are burdened by legacy policies and stove-piped activities that 
are de-conflicted, but not integrated either within DoD or between DoD 
and the Intelligence Community. We are taking measures to create a 
modern ISR capability.17 
One of the reforms outlined was horizontal integration: a planned “system-of-systems” 
that integrates surveillance capabilities across various human and technical intelligence 
disciplines and national, theater, tactical, and commercial programs.18 
It was after the call for up-to-the-minute information of near-real-time data in the 
operating environment that policy makers and military planners gave more attention to 
the issue of providing persistent surveillance. Just as philosopher Jeremy Bentham 
envisioned the panopticon being used as a tool to grant unrestrained power to observe the 
activities of convicts whenever desired, the U.S. military has envisioned that the 
introduction of persistent surveillance for military operators will provide the same against 
both known and unknown threats. If Bentham’s theory proves to be correct, the U.S. 
                                                 
16 Jeffrey Record, “The American Way of War: Cultural Barriers to Successful Counterinsurgency,” 
CATO Institute, Policy Analysis no. 577 (September 1, 2006), accessed on CATO Web site at: 
http://www.cato.o rg/ pub_ display. php?pub_id=6640. 
17 Stephen A. Cambone, “Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance,” Statement Before the 
Senate Armed Services Committee Strategic Forces Subcommittee, April 7, 2004, 11. 
18 Ibid. 
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military’s usage of persistent surveillance may also lead to the power to control behavior. 
The power to control, for the military, would be in terms of striking the enemy first. 
The introduction of persistent surveillance was not only a technologic 
advancement in multi-sensor operations, but also an introduction to the cultural shift 
occurring within U.S. politics in defense decision making and planning. Persistent 
surveillance is a technologic advancement in better understanding the battlespace 
environment, wherever that may be; a shift from past military strategic practice that 
focused on a conventional adversary and way of fighting. Persistent surveillance brings 
into view a more cautionary approach for future U.S. engagement in warfare. 
Whether it is gaining knowledge of a country’s nuclear proliferation or a known 
terrorist’s whereabouts, the ability to target, track and execute a decision that leads to 
action in securing national interests requires credible data linked real-time to decision-
makers. Timeliness in passing such information has been, and continues to be, of 
paramount concern in protecting and securing interests. Intelligence is perishable. 
Therefore, good intelligence on the adversary must be acted upon quickly before the 
adversary detects surveillance and subsequently changes its mode of operation to conceal 
its activity.   
Currently within the Department of Defense there are various definitions and 
concepts of what constitutes persistent surveillance. The lack of an agreed upon 
definition of persistent surveillance introduces an expensive transitional cost to the 
necessary shift in military leaders’ mindset called for by the U.S. Secretary of Defense.  
As technological capabilities in ISR have improved in the last few decades to deliver 
real-time information, the numbers of requests for access to information obtained through 
such means have increased. There has been a surge in requests for unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs), increased investments in national space-based platforms, as well as an 
effort to increase recruitment of human intelligence collectors. At the executive level, the 
U.S. government has initiated several programs to foster information sharing amongst 
federal agencies, as the value of full spectrum access to information has proven to be 
essential in national security planning for the asymmetrical threat being faced today. 
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Access to more information is believed to provide decision makers the ability to plan 
more accurately, thus achieving a higher probability of mission success.  
Most organizations are believed to either rise or fall based on how the 
introduction of change is assimilated into their systems, especially during tough 
economic times where the organization is faced with questionable funding to provide the 
necessary resources for the organization’s sustainability.19 A primary determinant of the 
future success of an organization is its leadership's ability to articulate clear visions that 
complement implementation of strategic goals and objectives.20 For the U.S. military, the 
organization’s success in implementing change with the introduction of persistent 
surveillance is no different. Not only must the military internally be able to assimilate 
internal change, but also attempt to manage the ever changing budgetary constraints 
imposed by the U.S. Congress to fund such technologic innovations as persistent 
surveillance.  
Whereas last year the Secretary of Defense was granted monies by Congress, a 
year later the U.S. Congressional Research Service and Congressional Budget Office is 
now advising the House Budget Committee that the Department of Defense should be 
given less, as much as $7 billion less each year on weapons procurement and research.21 
Such budgetary constraints could adversely affect DOD efforts in implementing the 
request for integrated ISR,22unless the military planners can prove such procurement is 
essential.  
The integration of more ISR is a transformational change for the U.S. military. 
Transformational change within organizations requires clear vision and precise 
definitions of how operations are to be achieved. It is in this vein that semantics play a 
key role, especially in the joint military environment. Unclear terminology can lead to 
                                                 
19 John C. Bruckman, “Overcoming Resistance to Change: Causal Factors, Interventions, and Critical 
Values,” The Psychologist-Manager Journal, 1550–3461, Volume 11, Issue 2, 2008, 211–219. 
20 Ibid. 
21 William Welsh, “DoD Budget forecast Threatens New Technology Developments,” Defense 




costly misunderstandings and change the course of both operations and strategic intent. 
An example of this confusion has been the semantic impact of the loosely defined term 
reachback in military operations. Reachback has been broadly associated as being “the 
relationship between forward deployed and in-garrison, geographically separated 
units.”23  
Unfortunately, the term has developed a negative connotation amongst some 
operational circles. According to U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff for Intelligence, 
Lieutenant General David A. Deptula, and Commander of the Air Force’s 480th ISR 
Wing, Colonel James R. Marrs, the term reachback has become synonymous with “not 
having the same sense of urgency” as the operational units forward. The perception, the 
AF officers opined, has led forward commanders to question the trustworthiness of ISR 
that is geographically separated from their forward units. According to Deptula and 
Marrs, 
Even though these views are in most cases without merit, detractors used 
the perceived faults of reachback to build a wall between them and any 
organization not located within the confines of their physical operational 
space. To them, if it was not organic or they did not control it, it did not 
matter.24 
Subsequently, the perception of the term has led to costly arguments between the Air 
Force and the Army over adoption of ISR distribution and asset allocations.  
“You can’t bring the soldier back to the farm once he has seen Paris,” said the 
Army’s former director of unmanned systems integration about the growing 
attractiveness of ISR to forward deployed units.25 The Army skepticism of ISR reachback 
has spurred debates all the way up to Congress over ISR resource allocation. Whereas the 
Army would like to have ISR assets directly tethered to forward units where they are 
                                                 
23 David A. Deptula and James R. Marrs, “Global Distributed ISR Operations: The Changing Face of 
Warfare,” Joint Force Quarterly, issue 54 (3rd Quarter 2009). 
24 Ibid. 
25 Demetri Savastopulo, “U.S. Military in Dogfight Over Drones,” Financial Times, August 20, 2007, 
at: http://ebird.afis.mil/ebfiles/e20070820537336.html. 
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perceived to be most responsive, the Air Force vehemently disagrees, claiming such plans 
of using ISR assets would provide sub-optimal employment.26  
‘All the services are representing their interests…the Army has worked the 
Alabama delegation as hard as the Air Force has worked the North Dakota 
and Ohio delegations,’ says Colonel Charles Bartlett, head of a special Air 
Force task force on UAVs…While Richard Shelby, the Republican 
senator from Alabama, is concerned about the impact on Redstone 
Arsenal, which manages much of the Army’s UAV work, Byron Dorgan, 
the North Dakota Democratic senator, wants to attract more work for 
Grand Forks Air Force base, partly to make up for the loss of four 
refueling squadrons scheduled as part of the Pentagon’s base realignment 
across the U.S.27 
Although the perception of ISR reachback remains in contention amongst service 
members and leadership, the executive agent authority over how ISR assets are 
developed was decided by an order to join the Army and Air force UAV programs under 
a joint integrated product team by Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England.28 
Could all of this bickering been prevented with a clearly defined definition and 
joint doctrine of the usage of ISR capabilities? Perhaps, but hind sight is always twenty-
twenty.  Now it is knowledge gained through experience that really matters as the debate 
on ISR reachback has attracted attention among Congressional members who now are 
requiring more clarity in going forward. 
U.S. Representative Bud Cramer, D-Huntsville, AL, said moving control 
of the military’s unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, would be disruptive 
and possibly dangerous to soldiers fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
“That’s what my concern is ultimately. We have to make sure our 
resources in (Iraq) and around the world are used properly.” Cramer 
inserted language in the 2008 Department of Defense spending bill that 
would require the Pentagon to carefully review any decision to move 
Army management of UAVs to the Air Force.29 
                                                 
26 Demetri Savastopulo, “U.S. Military in Dogfight Over Drones,” Financial Times, August 20, 2007, 
at: http://ebird.afis.mil/ebfiles/e20070820537336.html. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Carlo Munoz, “Services to Lay Groundwork For Joint Unmanned Drone Program,” Inside the 
Pentagon, September 20, 2007, at: http://ebird.afis.mil/ebfiles/e20070920546251.html. 
29 Shelby G. Spires, “Army Hoping to Keep UAvs from Air Force,” Huntsville (AL) Times, August 13, 
2007, at: http://ebird.afis.mil/ebfiles/e20070814536331.html. 
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Thus, as the debate broadens, it is more important than ever to be clear about the 
definitions of “persistent” and “persistent surveillance” currently in circulation within 
DoD: 
Current Definitions of Persistent: 
• “the length of time a sensor system can provide continuous coverage of an 
area of interest. It’s expressed as the average amount of time a sensing 
capability is able to focus on a particular geographical area of interest.”30    
• “the length of time a sensor can provide continuous coverage of a location, 
target, or activity of interest. What constitutes persistent varies 
significantly dependent upon Joint Force Commander’s (JFC) mission 
objectives, operational environment, and target type. The JFC’s desire for 
persistence is founded upon his ability to satisfy commander’s critical 
information requirements (CCIRs), priority intelligence requirements 
(PIRs), or essential elements of information (EEIs), with the current IRS 
enterprise due to problems or obstacles generated by friendly and/or 
adversary actions or capabilities.”31 
The two definitions of persistent cause the following consternation for ISR 
collection managers: 1) both definitions assume persistence in ISR is limited to sensors 
(what about human intelligence collection?); 2) both leave the “length of time” undefined 
(can assets be used persistently for days, months, years?); and 3) neither definition 
considers full-spectrum ISR collection to be used (the first definition talks of a “sensor 
system,” but it is unclear whether this a singular sensor or a combination of different 
sensors needed to obtain ‘persistence’?; the second definition omits the word “system,” 
suggesting that it is the operating capability of a particular sensor that provides persistent 
coverage).  
Current Definitions of Persistent Surveillance: 
                                                 
30 Department of Defense. “ISR Integration Roadmap” (D). V PB07, January 2007. 
31 DS Strategic Command. “Persistent ISR Planning and Directing Joint Integrating Concept,” Version 
1.0, 29 March 2007. 
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• “the integrated management of a diverse set of collection and processing 
capabilities, operated to detect and understand the activity of interest with 
sufficient sensor dwell, revisit rate and required quality to expeditiously 
assess adversary actions, predict adversary plans, deny sanctuary to an 
adversary, and assess results of U.S./coalition” actions.32  
•  “the integrated management of a diverse set of collection and processing 
capabilities to detect, locate, characterize, identify, track, target, and 
possibly provide battle damage assessment and retargeting against 
activities of interest, with sufficient coverage area, dwell, revisit, 
responsiveness, and quality to predict an adversary’s behaviors, and 
formulate and execute preemptive activities to deter or forestall 
anticipated adversary courses of action.”33 
• “a collection strategy that emphasizes the ability of some collection 
systems to linger on demand in an area to detect, locate, characterize, 
identify, track, target, and possibly provide battle damage assessment and 
re-targeting in real or near real time. Persistent surveillance facilitates the 
formulation and execution of preemptive activities to deter or forestall 
anticipated adversary course of action.”34 
• “a collection strategy that uses a full range of strategic, operational, and 
tactical collection systems to dwell on and revisit a target in order to 
detect, locate, characterize, identify, track, target and assess desired 
effects. Persistent surveillance contributes to the detection and recognition 
of meaningful changes in an adversary’s activities that support planning 
and executing preemptive actions to prevent likely adversary courses of 
action.”35 
                                                 
32 DS Strategic Command. “Persistent ISR Planning and Directing Joint Integrating Concept,” Version 
1.0,29 March 2007. 
33 Defense Intelligence Agency. “Joint Persistent Surveillance CONOPS” (D), 31 July 2008. 
34 Joint Publication 2–0. Joint Intelligence, 22 June 2007. 
35 JFCOM/J9 definition pre-JIPS conference. 
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The difference in these definitions leads to a central contentious issue amongst 
stakeholders who want to use persistent surveillance: Is persistent surveillance integrated 
management or a collection strategy? Integrated management is the process of 
maintaining or diverting readily available resources amongst operations. With regards to 
persistent surveillance, this would be the allocation of surveillance assets in an operating 
area without a specific, focused objective for its use. Conversely, the use of the persistent 
surveillance concept in a collection strategy would involve identifying a specific target 
set to a specific area with a specific focus during the pre-planning phase of an operation. 
The answer to this question prompts collection mangers, decision makers, and planners to 
view persistent surveillance as resource management (integrated management) or as a 
subsystem (collection strategy) impacting a larger strategic mission.  For example, the 
tracking of a commander’s critical information requirement (CCIR) can illustrate the 
semantic difference between integrated management and a collection strategy.  
If persistent surveillance is defined as integrated management, information 
systems are used to find and report elements to support the CCIR, but fail to report other 
information that might fall outside “the plan,” which if detected and reported, may 
advance other strategic objectives beyond those gained in the CCIR alone.36 Conversely, 
if a CCIR is being sought with persistent surveillance that is viewed as a collection 
strategy, “information pathways will move information directly to collaborative users 
(rather than through successive headquarters) and empower all echelons.”37 The 
difference in definitions not only impacts resource allocation of assets used to achieve the 
actual surveillance, but also the time, money and manpower required to train and equip 
DoD facilities, networks, and operators to ensure persistent surveillance can be executed 
properly.  
If persistent surveillance is considered “the guiding vision--a globally coherent 
national-security system” it will require “a coherent operational system to exercise all 
                                                 
36 David W. Pendall, “Persistent Surveillance and Its Implications for the Common Operating 
Picture,” Military Review, November/December 2005, 43. 
37 Ibid., 44. 
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elements of national power.”38 This would require a DoD transformation in how business 
is run; a paradigm shift that has been discussed in length but hesitantly acted on. Over the 
last two decades DoD has “under-invested” in true intelligence reform.39 
Technological advancements that enable better ISR collection have unequivocally 
been made over the last two decades, but the degree of transformation in how analysis is 
processed and passed to decision makers once the information is obtained has lagged 
behind.40 According to author Gregory Treverton, policy officials see the value of 
intelligence only after an issue becomes important and are looking for perspective on 
dealing with it. Treverton criticizes policy officials for not seeing the value of intelligence 
and the information intelligence assets can obtain until it’s too late. He asserts that 
officials are interested in intelligence on their terms and their terms only. Treverton 
writes, 
Policy officials are likely to want intelligence at three points of an issue. 
First: when they see an issue becoming important; intelligence gives them 
a sense of perspective. Secondly: when they have to decide what to do 
about an issue; at this point they want intelligence to help them to consider 
alternative ways to approach the issue. Thirdly: when policy officials have 
made up their minds on how to act they welcome intelligence out only if it 
supports their view.41 
In the realms of intelligence, most would agree that having any prior surveillance 
on a target set is better than having none at all. USSOCOM recognized the need for an 
intelligence architecture equal to the enemy they faced (the Al-Qaida network); an enemy 
that was adaptive, flexible, agile and capable of inflicting harm on U.S. interests 
anytime.42 But, by having more ISR assets that allow persistent surveillance are decision-
makers always better off? 
                                                 
38 David W. Pendall, “Persistent Surveillance and Its Implications for the Common Operating 
Picture,” Military Review, November/December 2005, 45. 
39 Robert K. Ackerman, “Persistent Surveillance Comes Into View.”  Signal Online, May 2002. 
40 Gregory F. Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001, 183–185. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Judy G. Chizek, “Military Transformation: Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.” CRS 
Report for Congress, January 17, 2003. 
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This issue is a contentious one between services, in particular the Air Force and 
the Army.  The debate over how persistent surveillance is allocated and used is divided. 
Currently each of the armed services is struggling to work together to optimize ISR and 
UAV capabilities. General Deptula pointed this out when asked about the progress on 
policy to ease the problems with flying UAVs in battlefield theaters. In reference to the 
debate between the Air Force and Army over executive agent authority of theater-wide 
ISR assets General Deptula is under the belief that, 
There are no Air Force targets in Iraq and Afghanistan. The targets belong 
to the joint force commander. So the issue is between the perspective of 
the overall joint force commander and a local unit commander. To 
optimize UAS capability for all, the theater-capable UAVs should be 
flown in line with what the joint commander needs, while also ensuring 
there are enough local-capable UAS assets to meet smaller unit 
commander’s needs. It is very important that we follow our tried-and-true 
joint organizational approaches that have existed since the 1986 
Goldwater-Nichols Act. We could be doing it better.43 
Although the decision to grant executive agent authority to either service was ended with 
the Deputy Defense Secretary England’s decision to create a task force for joint ISR 
planning in 2007, the Army continues to pursue independent concepts. An example of 
this was the publication of an article entitled “Tactical Persistent Surveillance” in the 
summer 2008 issue of the Army’s Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin.44 
The article was co-written by the director, deputy director and the ISR division 
chief of the Army’s Concept Development Directorate at the Army Intelligence Center. 
In this document the authors agreed that despite numerous attempts, DoD had yet to 
adequately define the term for persistent surveillance—its capabilities and limitations.45 
Instead they proposed an Army-centric definition for “tactical persistent surveillance.” 
The authors claimed the joint endeavor for defining persistent surveillance was focused 
on the “operational and strategic concerns and typically focused upon space and/or aerial 
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platforms such as UAS,” whereas their proposed definition “specifically pointed to 
tactical echelon support.”46  Yet, the authors also pointed out that “the success of the 
future modular force brigade combat teams (BCT) depended significantly upon the 
integration of ISR capabilities at all echelons, and the capability to provide tactical 
persistent surveillance and exploitation of the area of operations.”47  
While the authors’ attempt to clarify the use of persistent surveillance is well 
intended, the document has the ability to confuse and distort the joint definition for 
persistent surveillance. The on-going joint endeavor to pursue integrated persistent 
surveillance requires joint initiatives in budgeting, contracting, and interdependent 
connectivity between services. The proposal for defining an Army tactical use of 
persistent surveillance undermines this joint endeavor, an endeavor that Deputy Defense 
Secretary England sought with the development of the ISR task force in 2007 and the 
Defense Secretary’s plea for joint warfighter support.  
Although one can argue that the article was just another concept piece within a 
military sponsored publication, it is fair to assume the authors are well thought of within 
the service and as such the article illustrates the mindset of the service’s Concept 
Development Directorate at the Army’s Intelligence Center. Their definition of persistent 
surveillance allows latitude for operational interpretation. Latitudes of interpretation can 
quickly morph from ideology based on the interpretation to standard operating practice 
within organizations. Once operating practices begin to normalize within an organization 
they are almost impossible to correct.  
One example that illustrates the dangers of poorly defined concepts is the Federal 
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GPS units in an aircraft. The dilemma began when field inspectors were tasked to 
interpret whether or not hand-held GPS units were "installed" in aircraft and when the 
devices technically were not.48  
Because of the lack of policy and guidance material regarding the FAA’s 
definition of the installation of a hand-held GPS unit in an aircraft, FAA 
field inspectors are routinely misinterpreting the FAA’s policy. For 
example, in one region of the United States a FAA inspector may state that 
the use of Velcro to attach a hand-held GPS unit to the yoke constitutes an 
installation and requires the filing of a FAA form 337. Meanwhile, in 
another region of the United States an inspector may state that as long as 
no tools are needed to remove the hand-held unit from the aircraft, no 
form 337 or field approval is required. These inconsistent interpretations 
often cause users of hand-held GPS units to complete unnecessary 
paperwork or undergo unneeded bureaucratic procedures to legally use 
their hand-held GPS units on board their aircraft. If nothing else, 
misinterpretations and misapplications of FAA policy can cause 
considerable aggravation to users of hand-held GPS units.49 
A documented lesson learned this example shows the dangers of using undefined or under-
defined concepts that in turn lead to operational misapplication and a cycle of wasted 
resources. Is this the path of persistence surveillance? The broad usage of the term amongst 
the myriad of applications and justifications give the impression that it is. 
Where can true “information and information technologies…significantly increase 
the likelihood of success”?50 Do all military operations merit the allocation of assets to 
provide persistent surveillance? From this author’s perspective, the answer is no. Persistent 
surveillance is costly; costly in terms of system employment, manpower for system 
operability and most importantly, the security of protecting U.S. tactics and techniques from 
being manipulated by the enemy. Planning the employment of persistent surveillance needs 
to be carefully considered; cause and effects of its use critically deliberated, and clearly 
defined objectives discussed prior to allocation in all military manners. 
                                                 
48 Informational article entitled “Inconsistent FAA Interpretation Leads to Problems with use of Hand-
Held GPS Units in Aircraft,” accessed on October 20, 2009, on Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association 
Online at: http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/regulatory/reghandheld.html. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Franklin D. Kramer, Larry Wentz, and Stuart Starr, “I-Power: The Information Revolution and 
Stability Operations,” Defense Horizons, 55, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 
February 2007). 
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III. RESEARCH DESIGN  
The overall design and methodology is a historical case study of the use of 
persistent surveillance in U.S. CENTCOM. This chapter will explain how the various 
missions used in the study were selected and define the criteria used for the analysis.   
A. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF PERSISTENT SURVEILLANCE  
The research used for this paper was based on analysis of military missions in 
Iraq, specifically military missions that occurred between 2003 and 2007. The examples 
selected are: the Jessica Lynch POW mission, the capture of Saddam Hussein, the battles 
of Fallujah, the hunt for Zarqawi, the joint counter-IED effort led by the Joint Improvised 
Explosive Device Detection Organization (JIEDDO), and Army counter-IED effort under 
Task Force ODIN. Due to the nature of classified operations and the restriction on 
disclosure of classified military capabilities, these historic examples, available from 
open-source information, provide unclassified evidence of real-world ISR assets that used 
persistent surveillance. These examples were selected for study because they are all 
prominent examples of the use of persistent surveillance—either militarily significant, 
such as the battles of Fallujah, or widely discussed publicly, such as the rescue of Jessica 
Lynch—for which data is available at the unclassified level. 
Why use the 2001 and 2006 QDRs to analyze the evolution of the growing value 
of persistent surveillance? Whereas the 2001 QDR introduced persistent surveillance as a 
potential operational goal, the concept evolved during the start of OIF in 2003 and 
continued through 2005. This led to the 2006 QDR fully declaring that persistent 
surveillance was an invaluable operational capability and vital to mission success in the 
war in Iraq. Evaluation of the persistent surveillance concept before, after and between 
the QDRs shows the impact conditions may have had in the interpretation of  how the 
concept was used by the services.  
The intent of the QDR was to understand the Department of Defense’s acquisition 
of new technologies and was directed by the U.S. Congress. After the end of the Cold  
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War, there was a need to better understand and validate the Department’s expenditures. 
Congress desired more insight in order to help guide budgetary decisions. The law 
instructing the QDR reads, 
Title 10, Section 118 of the United States Code specifies: “The Secretary 
of Defense shall every four years, during a year following a year evenly 
divisible by four, conduct a comprehensive examination (to be known as a 
“quadrennial defense review”) of the national defense strategy, force 
structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other 
elements of the defense program and policies of the United States with a 
view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United 
States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years. Each such 
quadrennial defense review shall be conducted in consultation with the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”51 
Thus, the QDR is designed to assess Department of Defense strategy and the reasoning 
behind the request of technology and systems to counter national security threats in the 
security environment of the twenty-first-century.52  After the fall of the Soviet Union and 
the end of the Cold War, there was a need to understand the reasoning behind defense 
decision making and planning. The QDR was to serve as the overall strategic planning 
document for the Department of Defense.53   
Principal Deputy Undersecretary for Policy, Ryan Henry, believed that the 2006 
QDR showed that there was a shift taking place from traditional conventional warfare 
thinking within the U.S. military. Henry implied that the effectiveness of warfare was no 
longer calculated by the number of targets achieved, but rather how missions were being 
accomplished. He stated, "It's not about numbers. Numbers don't tell you if you can get 
the job done, it's about capabilities."54 The 2006 QDR stated that the success of the force 
depended on “an unblinking eye over the battle space through persistent surveillance” in 
                                                 
51 Title 10, Section 118 of the United States Code, available on the Office of Law Revision Counsel, 
U.S. House of Representatives Web site at: http://uscode.house.gov/uscode-
cgi/fastweb.exe?getdoc+uscview+t09t12+54+1++()%20%20AND%20((10)%20ADJ%20USC)%3ACITE
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52 William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, (Washington, D.C.: Department), 
May 1997, iv. 
53 Ibid., 2. 
54 Donna Miles, “DoD Releases QDR to Chart Way Ahead to Confront Future,” American Forces 
Press, February 3, 2006, at: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=14953. 
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order to succeed at future “…operations against any target, day or night, in any weather, and 
in denied or contested areas.”55 Whether or not the services shared this view helps in 
understanding how the services approach acquisition for such capabilities. 
How was persistent surveillance employed and how effective was that employment? 
In Iraq, the increased use of persistent surveillance is believed to be based upon the unique 
operational needs of ongoing irregular warfare.56 But the breadth of missions and the 
emerging need for persistent surveillance challenged the force. The tasking, processing, 
exploitation, and dissemination (TPED) associated with each intelligence discipline (signals, 
imaging, etc.) differed amongst the services, combat support agencies, and from national to 
tactical assets and applications.57 Did the missions reviewed warrant the use for persistent 
surveillance or did services feel compelled to use persistent surveillance based upon stronger 
dissent of military commanders from the “silk scarf syndrome?”58 The answer to this 
question provides the basis for the analysis of effectiveness discussed in Chapter V.  
The assessment of the effectiveness of persistent surveillance is based on three 
criteria: 1) the environment the sensor platforms were used in (i.e., was it an optimal 
performance environment (weather, climate, operating altitude, degree of interoperability 
with other sensors); 2) the experience of the operators (i.e., had the operators using the 
intelligence gathered by persistent surveillance worked in the area being collected on before? 
Or was this the first time they were learning of the environment); and 3) the clarity of the use 
of persistent surveillance (i.e., how focused was the surveillance area? Narrow, broad, 
undefined?).  Creation of the criteria was based on abstracted information believed to play a 
critical role in the evolution of the surveillance concept as depicted by news articles and 
Congressional testimony during the analyzed time periods.   
                                                 
55 QDR 2006, 67, accessed on Department of Defense Web site at: 
http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf. 
56 In preparing for the upcoming QDR 2010, a Quadrennial Roles and Mission Review (QRM) was 
conducted by the Secretary of Defense to assess what has transpired in the military’s capabilities since 
publication of the 2006 QDR. Information derived from the posted January 2009 QRM, 32, accessed on the 
Department of Defense Web site at: 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2009/QRMFinalReport_v26Jan.pdf. 
57 Information from 2009 QRM, 26, accessed from Department of Defense Web site at: 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2009/QRMFinalReport_v26Jan.pdf. 
58 Silk scarf syndrome meant the commander’s preference of using manned aviation n over unmanned 
aerial vehicles; concept was used in Elizabeth Bone and Christopher Bolcom, “Unmanned Aerial vehicles: 
Background and Issues for Congress,” Report for Congress, The Library of Congress, April 25, 2003, 1.  
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IV. PERSISTENCE SURVEILLANCE 2003–2007 
Now that we have outlined the methodology used in examining this historical case 
study, this chapter will explore historical events that used the persistent surveillance 
concept from 2003-2007.  This chapter will also discuss how these historical events 
transformed the concept’s perceived importance in military operations. As mentioned in 
Chapter III, the historical events explored will include: the rescue of Army POW Jessica 
Lynch in 2003; the capture of hiding Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in 2003; Operations 
in Fallujah in 2004; the value of persistent surveillance in the capture of insurgent leader 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2006; and two different efforts focused on the problem of 
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), the Army’s Task Force ODIN project and in the 
Department of Defense’s Joint Improvised Explosive Device Detection Organization 
(JIEDDO).    
A. THE INTRODUCTION OF PERSISTENT SURVEILLANCE (2003–2005) 
The use of persistent surveillance in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) represented 
an evolutionary development for surveillance tactics as much as it did a revolutionary 
development59 in how warfare was fought. The increased awareness of persistent 
surveillance, stemming from the 2001 QDR, allowed military planners to incorporate the 
concept in OIF operational planning. Conventional forces grew increasingly aware and 
attracted to the use of persistent surveillance at the onset of the conflict. Unfortunately, 
the majority of the conventional force lacked experience with the capabilities of the 
surveillance, as it was practically nonexistent prior to 2003, except in operations 
involving Special Forces.  
The use of the concept began in earnest at the onset of OIF. Military analysts, 
planners and decision makers were constantly submitting requests for information (RFI) 
to intelligence collection operators to fill critical intelligence gaps in the war. In 
                                                 
59 Carlo Kopp, “Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance During Operation Iraqi Freedom,” at: 
http://www.ausairpower.net/DT-ISR-OIF-04.pdf. 
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executing missions that fulfilled the RFIs, the newly fielded persistent surveillance assets 
quickly earned the confidence of DoD leadership as an invaluable resource.  
Lieutenant General Walter E. Buchanan III, Commander of U.S. Central 
Command Air Forces, acknowledged this during testimony before the House Armed 
Services Committee in 2004. He stated that “prior to launching the first weapons to rid 
Iraq of Saddam Hussein, Predators flew above Baghdad gathering data, monitoring HVTs 
and providing us real-time intelligence information.”60 
The first example of the capabilities Gen. Buchannan referenced had been made 
public a year earlier in the rescue efforts of captured American prisoner of war, Army 
Private Jessica Lynch in April 2003.  Decision makers viewed the rescue live from the 
persistent Predator full-motion video surveillance streams. Once Private Lynch was safe 
in U.S. custody, the video of the complex joint rescue mission was released for public 
consumption. The New York Times reported the mission as being “the most prominent 
example of this complexity.”61 The paper stated, 
As it unfolded, Marine Corps artillery created a diversion, while Army 
Rangers seized the perimeter of the hospital where she was held and Navy 
Seals pulled her out on a stretcher. Air Force AC-130 gunships were on 
call to bring their withering cannon fire into play if the rescuers ran into 
trouble.62 
The all-weather, through the cloud, surveillance performance of the Predator63 provided 
the experienced rescue teams the capability to have real-time insight of the operations 
from above. This gave a bird’s eye view of the mission simultaneously to decision 
makers and operators for seamless coordination.  
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Once made public, the surveillance gave Americans, and the world, a glimpse of 
operations as “they happened,” garnering public support for both the technology and on-
going military missions in OIF.  
The next example of the successful use of persistent surveillance was the 
employment of around-the-clock surveillance coverage to assist in the capture of exiled 
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Hussein was considered to be the number one high 
value target in Iraq at the time, and his capture was deemed a huge success for coalition 
forces, and the performance of persistent surveillance was lauded with further public 
approval for its employment. 
“Operation Red Dawn,” as the capture was referred to, occurred on December 13, 
2003. The operation consisted of approximately 600 soldiers from the 4th Infantry 
Division, coalition forces, and special operations forces.64 The mission objective was 
clear, the target known, and the force working on the mission was inherently “joint” from 
the operation’s conception.  
In this case, intense persistent human intelligence collection via interrogations of 
close associates of Saddam Hussein had been conducted in an effort to close in on the 
dictator’s location.65 In order to verify the gathered clues, persistent aerial surveillance 
was used. A tip that Saddam had been driving around in a battered old cab was an 
example of such a clue hunted by aerial surveillance assets.66 Acting quickly, the location 
of the hiding dictator was narrowed to an area right outside his hometown of Tikrit, 
where raids of hideouts revealed traces that the dictator had in fact been in the area.67 
Raids within the area intensified until forces eventually found Saddam Hussein.  
Public accounts of both events attributed much of their success to the use of 
persistent surveillance. The concept quickly began to earn a large vote of confidence 
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from DoD decision makers and planners, who began to increase the concept’s usage—
just as enemy tactics began to shift from conventional to insurgent warfare on the ground.  
U.S. forces in particular were not prepared for such a fight, largely because 
American leaders could not come to an agreement that the conventional war they had 
entered had now shifted to a type of warfare they were unprepared for.  The insurgent 
warfare that erupted on the ground took American leadership by surprise. Instead of 
taking the advice of Karl von Clausewitz, who had argued, “…the most far reaching act 
of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish ... the kind of 
war on which they are embarking,”68 American decision makers took on a semantic 
disagreement over what type of warfare coalition partners were involved in.  
During General John Abizaid’s first press conference as the Commanding General 
of CENTCOM, he made reference that the shift being witnessed on the Iraqi battlefield 
was that of a “classical guerrilla-type campaign.”69 In a poignant disagreement with such 
claims, the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, argued that there was no guerilla war 
in Iraq and that “…it would be a misunderstanding and a miscommunication… to the 
people of the country and the world” to say that there was one, instead argued that there 
were “five different things” going on in Iraq: “looters, criminals, remnants of the 
Ba’athist regime, foreign terrorists, and those influenced by Iran.”70  
The underlying issue of the argument was publicly admitting that the insurgent 
warfare posed a significant challenge for the conventionally trained U.S. forces. The 
challenge was to be able to separate the good guys from the bad within a population that 
now harbored the enemy. There was virtually no distinction between those who targeted 
coalition forces and the innocent civilian among whom they lived.  
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So when U.S. President George Bush demanded military objectives be achieved 
while limiting affects on the civilian population,71 much more emphasis was placed on 
verifying the “target” before engaging the enemy than ever before. It was this new 
emphasis that gave the persistent surveillance concept a larger operational necessity. 
Collateral damage on mistaken targets had the propensity of having large operational and 
strategic political implications for the coalition forces engaged in Iraq. The use of 
persistent surveillance was believed to help minimize false targets.  
The use of persistent surveillance as a resource to aid in filtering the “good from 
the bad” with more fidelity drove military planners to incorporate the persistent 
surveillance concept into more operational missions. Seen as a more reliable and capable 
means of gaining and verifying intelligence in the new batllespace environment of 
insurgent warfare in Iraq, the use of multi-sensor aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, and 
human intelligence sources on the ground in close coordination grew to be viewed as the 
“best way forward” in beating the enemy. Under this assumption, military planners began 
to further integrate the allocation of multi-sensing platforms into operations. Whether it 
was answering a commander’s need for an essential element of information (EEI) or 
providing an update on a known insurgent’s location, requests for and the allocation of 
surveillance assets in operations began to soar in 2004. A Congressional Research 
Service report highlighted the increase of appropriated funding of DoD budget requests 
for more UAVs: 
The growing awareness and support in Congress and the Department of 
Defense for UAVs, investments in unmanned aerial vehicles have been 
increasing every year. The Fiscal Year 2001 (FY01) investment in UAVs 
was approximately $667 million, while the FY03 funding totaled over 
$1.1 billion dollars. The Pentagon has asked for $1.39 billion in 
procurement and development funding for FY04, with much more planned 
for the out years.72 
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The growing investment by the DoD in UAVs indicated there was an increased 
emphasis on both the use of and the confidence in using more surveillance. Even with no 
public acknowledgment or precise definition as to how and for what the surveillance 
would be used in operations, requests for budget increases passed without question. And 
with more surveillance assets in circulation for use without clear and concise parameters 
for allocation, military decision makers and planners began to assign assets with little 
operational justification. 
The start of ambiguous persistent surveillance usage was illustrated in two major 
operations that used persistent surveillance in Fallujah in 2004; the first in April and the 
other in November. Each operation used persistent surveillance, but each operation had a 
different outcome. The successful usage of the surveillance concept occurred when 
planners took more time to coordinate the concept amongst units involved prior to the 
onset of operations. 
In the early part of 2004 in Fallujah, insurgents ambushed four American 
contractors working for Blackwater while they were driving through the city, their bodies 
mutilated and hung from a bridge.73  The grisly event caused grave concern amongst the 
leaders in Baghdad, Washington and within the capitals of invested coalition partners 
partaking in securing an Iraq after Saddam.  
Under the old Iraqi regime, Fallujah had enjoyed some special 
prerogatives and had produced a number of senior leaders in Iraq’s various 
security forces. Many residents therefore had some reason to be concerned 
about their place in the post-Saddam Iraq.74 
Despite some political reservations on both Iraqi and coalition partners, a counter-
response to the insurgent factions believed to be responsible for the American contractor 
deaths in Fallujah commenced on April 4, 2004. Operation Vigilant Resolve, as it was 
called, “featured 1,300 marines from I MEF, along with some Iraqi participants. The 
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marines surrounded the city, and then teams made forays into it in an attempt to locate 
those responsible for the slayings and draw out other insurgents.”75 
Once again, surveillance assets were requested for the operation in addition to Air 
Force AC-130 gunships to support the Marine contingent on the ground. Due to limited 
information about those responsible for the deaths, both Marines on the ground and aerial 
surveillance assets allocated to the fight had limited intelligence to go on in finding the 
culprits within Fallujah. Up against non-conventional forces, the coalition force tried to 
separate civilians between insurgent factions by warning civilians to leave the city before 
the armed conflict would begin. According to the Congressional Research Service, 
The Marines began the Fallujah operations by setting conditions—turning 
off electrical power, and urging the civilians of Fallujah to leave the city. 
The vast majority of residents did depart—leaving about 500 hardcore 
fighters, who employed asymmetrical tactics against a far larger, stronger 
force…The operation reportedly included 540 air strikes, 14,000 artillery 
and mortar shells fired, and 2,500 tank main gun rounds fired. Some 70 
U.S. personnel were killed, and 609 wounded.76 
There were allegations of numerous civilian casualties in the battles, so much so that 
within days of Operation Vigilant Resolve’s commencement, operations were halted.77  
Although the decision to halt operations was a political one and not due to any 
specific operational failure, the public criticized the use of the persistent surveillance 
concept during Operational Vigilant Resolve largely due to misrepresentation by media. 
The surveillance assets were seen as having been ineffective. A joint effort began soon 
after Operation Vigilant Resolve ended to re-evaluate the use of the concept; and at the 
same time, planners drew up a new plan for Fallujah. 
Operation Phantom Fury, the second battle of Fallujah, commenced in November 
2004. Of specific concern to Iraqi’s future stability, U.S. and coalition forces were 
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focused on defeating the Zarqawi insurgent network, believed to be based in Fallujah.78 
According to Michèle Flournoy, senior adviser for the Center of Strategic International 
Studies (CSIS) International Security Program, the operation was critical to OIF. She 
stated,   
This battle has the potential to be a turning point in Iraq — putting the 
country on the road to greater stability, elections and hope or causing it to 
backslide further into violence and despair. The real challenge for the U.S. 
and Iraqi forces in Fallujah will be to win this battle without losing the war 
— that is, to defeat the insurgents without turning the Iraqi population 
against them.79 
In an account of Operation Phantom Fury, AIR FORCE magazine contributing editor, Dr. 
Rebecca Grant, described persistent surveillance as a key component in fighting against 
insurgents. She wrote, 
Counterinsurgency efforts across Iraq relied heavily on persistent 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance from air and space 
platforms. Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom had 
already proved the value of persistence. Now, for stability operations, the 
role of persistent surveillance was doubly important.80 
Operation Phantom Fury was a meticulously planned joint operation that took months of 
planning. Planners had mapped Fallujah “down to the street addresses,” which was 
considered to be one of the “…huge successes of Fallujah II…” according to military 
operators involved in planning the operation.81 
The planners, as well as the operators involved in the mission, were all 
experienced with the region and effectively allocated surveillance assets, such as the 
Predator, to provide persistent situational awareness of changes to the battlespace.  In Dr. 
Grant’s article, the persistent surveillance was described as “…a God’s-eye picture for 
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troops on the ground…,” saving lives every day as restricted lines of sight that had once 
favored defenders were overcome by the persistent surveillance concept achieved by the 
Predator and other tactical UAVs such as Pioneer.82 
Operation Phantom Fury also had the benefit of almost unlimited access and 
allocation to ISR assets for optimal sensor performance. Sensors had a high degree of 
fidelity with interoperability, allowing “direct feeds via satellite to command centers and 
selected forces on the ground opened up a full-motion video perspective on the street 
battle” near-real-time, all the time unbeknownst by insurgent forces.83  
The battle of Fallujah in November 2004 was the first large contingency of joint 
“conventional forces” to experience the benefits of streaming situational awareness, soon 
to be known in the field as geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), derived from the persistent 
surveillance concept. A shift in the cultural mindset was occurring amongst the  forces. 
With a better understanding of what persistent surveillance could provide to engaging 
forces on the ground, the requests by the warfighter to have the capability in daily 
operations grew astronomically. For example, a former Marine involved in the operation 
recalled the value of GEOINT gained from the persistent surveillance, 
The expansion of GEOINT and the Marines’ familiarization with it 
became the catalyst for its exponential growth in the field. During 
Operation Phantom Fury, the Marines executed the missions assigned with 
the tools they were given… The Marines who had now “grown up” with 
GEOINT support wanted it all the time and knew exactly what to ask 
for—and they weren’t waiting around for it. It was no longer viewed as a 
“nice to have”; it was a “must have.”84 
The success of Operation Phantom Fury inspired more interest in persistent surveillance 
throughout the halls of Congress and the Pentagon.  
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In 2005 Marine commanders listed persistent surveillance as one of their top 
priority needs.85 The request sparked a joint research project between graduate students at 
the Air Force Institute of Technology and scientists at Los Alamos National Laboratories. 
The joint venture developed a tactical persistent surveillance asset known as Angel Fire. 
Without a clearly defined definition of persistent surveillance for guidance of the 
concept’s use in operations, the program developers created this definition for Angel 
Fire:  
…persistent, city-sized surveillance…by providing real-time imaging 
capabilities, IED and other threats … can be detected, prevented and/or 
negated. Angel Fire is particularly well-suited to provide enhanced 
situational awareness to forces operating in an urban environment, convoy 
operations or other ground operations.86 
Although the intent of the project was to meet the needs of the warfighter in the most 
expeditious way possible to fight the fight, the acquisition of the newly fielded persistent 
surveillance asset was delayed in getting out to the field because of controversy between 
services. At the same time Air Force and Marines were pushing for the acquisition of 
Angel Fire, the Army was pushing another tactical asset for inter-service application of 
providing persistent surveillance. Their asset was called Constant Hawk. According to a 
press report,   
Gary Stradling, the Angel Fire project leader at Los Alamos, e-mailed 
Marine and Air Force officials to warn them the Army was pushing 
Constant Hawk "specifically to pre-empt USMC/Angel Fire." He also 
urged the Marines and Air Force to seek help from members of Congress, 
including Sen. Pete Domenici, R-N.M…Other e-mails were sent directly 
to staff members at the Senate and House of Representatives, urging them 
to raise the issue with their bosses and help speed delivery of Angel Fire.87 
Without a clear and concise joint definition of the usage of persistent surveillance, 
each service began to independently interpret how the surveillance should and could be 
used. Despite good intentions of fulfilling requests from the field for more surveillance 
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assets, each of the armed services requested more money to fund more persistent 
surveillance assets, sparking multiple independent acquisition programs. Each service 
justified their requests as a “top priority request” from the field that needed to be put in 
operation as soon as possible in order to prevail in the battlefields of Iraq. What the 
services failed to understand was that the persistent surveillance concept depended on 
several factors, not just having access or control of the asset alone.  
The outgrowth of persistent surveillance from 2003-2005 experienced both 
effective and ineffective employment. Factors that played into effective use of the 
surveillance concept included: 1) the environment the sensor platforms were used in (i.e., 
was it an optimal performance environment (weather, climate, operating altitude, degree 
of interoperability with other sensors); 2) the experience of the operators (i.e., had the 
operators using the intelligence gathered by persistent surveillance worked in the area 
being collected on before? Or was this the first time they were learning of the 
environment); and 3) the clarity of the use of persistent surveillance (i.e., how focused 
was the surveillance area? Narrow, broad, undefined?).  
B. THE CALL FOR MORE PERSISTENT SURVEILLANCE (2006–2007) 
By 2006, persistent surveillance had become so popular that the call for its usage 
had expanded tenfold. The concept had morphed almost completely from usage for high 
value targets and missions to an everyday resource ground commanders believed was 
necessary in order to conduct operations taking place in Iraq. Persistent surveillance had 
gone from fulfilling intelligence gaps in baseline intelligence assessments for mainly 
strategic objectives to actively seeking unknown gaps for tactical operations.  
While the services were battling both Pentagon and Congressional resources to 
fund their requests for more surveillance assets, strategy in Iraq focused on neutralizing 
the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) used by insurgents that gave them an 
offensive advantage against coalition forces and defeating the insurgent network at its 
core.   
In 2006, persistent surveillance was considered essential in the take down of the 
man was believed to be the insurgent leader of all of Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The 
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“unblinking eye” was considered invaluable to tracking, verifying and (at the end) 
guiding the bombs that would end Zarqawi’s life.   
A reconnaissance-surveillance team from Delta Force’s B Squadron, 
assigned to TF 145’s Task Force North, infiltrated the area to get “eyes 
on” the house, said a source in the special operations community. Sources 
said a Predator unmanned aerial vehicle was overhead.88  
During a June 2006 mission debriefing to the press, Army General Bill Caldwell 
explained that for “the first time that we … had definitive, unquestionable information as 
to exactly where he was located,” in a place where he could be hit “without causing 
collateral damage to other Iraqi civilians and personnel in the area.89 Operators involved 
in the operation were once again experienced, they were familiar with the operating 
terrain, and they had conducted a great deal of coordination amongst assets prior to 
commencing operations. Along with this, the target was known and the use of the 
surveillance assets was used in a narrowly defined search area. 
In a separate, but similar type of use against insurgent warfare, the Army sought 
out a tactical source to aid in the hunt for improvised explosive devices (IEDs)-- the most 
notorious weapon against U.S. and coalition troops in Iraq.90 A task force, once confined 
in secrecy, was created by order of the Army’s Vice Chief of Staff, General Richard A. 
Cody; the task force was named Task Force Observe, Detect, Identify and Neutralize (TF 
ODIN).91 The program was said to have been triggered “by the limited numbers of USAF 
Predator UAVs in Iraq, and consequent refusal of many Army requests”92 from ground 
commanders for operational surveillance. Considered a success, TF ODIN is said to be 
responsible for enabling Army ground commanders to mount a full surveillance and 
strike effort in Iraq. According to one report, since its conception in July 2007 to June 
                                                 
88 Sean D. Naylor, “Inside the Zarqawi Takedown; Persistent Surveillance Helps End 3-Year 
Manhunt,” Defense News, June 12, 2006, Vol. 21, No. 4, 1. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Brad Knickerbocker, “Relentless Toll to U.S. troops of Roadside Bombs,” The Christian Science 
Monitor, January 2, 2007, at: http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0102/p01s03-usmi.html. 
91 David Pugliese, “Task Force ODIN: In the Valleys of the Blind,” Defense Industry Daily, January 
15, 2009, at: http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Task-Force-ODIN-In-the-Valleys-of-the-Blind-05250/. 
92 Ibid. 
 41
2008, the effort killed more than 3,000 adversaries, and led to the capture of almost 150 
insurgent leaders.93 TF ODIN’s biggest advantage is believed to be the persistent 
surveillance capability along with sensor scans that can detect signatures of disturbed 
earth or new pavement, which signals ground units to be wary of newly buried IEDs. 
ODIN’s current workhorses in Iraq are eight Warrior Alpha UAVs 
equipped with full-motion video cameras and other imagery systems, and 
about 10 C-12 King Air turboprops, most equipped with video cameras 
and, on occasion, signals intelligence sensors. They are linked by radio to 
brigade commanders and to such aircraft as Apache helicopters that can 
quickly swoop in for a kill. Using computer software, intelligence analysts 
assigned to the task force have pieced together pattern-of-life imagery to 
trace the movements of insurgents suspected of planting IEDs along 
convoy routes. 94 
TF ODIN was welcomed and commended by the Army with open arms. Like the Marines 
and other conventional forces that had experienced the benefits of persistent surveillance, 
operators would no longer be content with anything less than having the availability of 
constant coverage and situational awareness of their forward operating area at the time of 
their choosing. 
Although the Army had gone solo on the creating and acquisitioning TF ODIN, 
both the Department of Defense and Congress soon became convinced of the Army’s 
efforts and charged that if more surveillance assets, such as those used in TF ODIN, were 
available, more lives would be saved and the fight against insurgent led IEDs could be 
defeated.  
In February 2006, the Department of Defense stood up the Joint Improvised 
Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). The organization’s mission was to 
“…focus (lead, advocate, coordinate) all Department of Defense actions in support of 
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Combatant Commanders' and their respective Joint Task Forces' efforts to defeat 
improvised explosive devices as weapons of strategic influence.”95 
Included in the mission was the use of increased persistent surveillance for 
attacking the insurgent network at the tactical level. Congress responded in the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, to which the House of Representatives 
Committee on Armed Services recommended $100 million in Title XV for the rapid 
procurement of no less than ten manned, aerial, persistent surveillance platforms for 
tactical operations. The decision was based on the recognition that, 
…there is a critical tactical mission requirement in OIF and OEF for 
additional manned, aerial, persistent surveillance platforms to combat 
asymmetric threats such as IED. The committee understands IEDs 
continue to be the primary cause of casualties for U.S. armed forces in 
OIF and OEF. The committee is aware that current surveillance platforms 
deployed in OIF and OEF are used almost exclusively for intelligence 
gathering missions rather than direct support of tactical operations such as 
interdiction of IED emplacement and convoy security.96 
Additionally, the committee expected that, 
…manned, aerial, persistent surveillance platforms be rapidly procured for 
use by ground commanders in OIF and OEF. The committee believes that 
if these platforms are employed in tactical operations, such as conducting 
persistent road surveillance missions, then these platforms could prevent 
the emplacement of IEDs and counter other threats faced by U.S. armed 
forces on the roads in Iraq. The committee expects these platforms to be 
configured and staffed so that they can be rapidly deployed and easily 
maintained without placing additional, unnecessary logistic burdens on 
U.S. armed forces. The committee also expects these platforms to be 
equipped for day and night surveillance and for simple, direct 
communication with ground- and air-based quick reaction forces.97  
Considered to be a huge win for tactical units in the field, the success of expansion of 
persistent surveillance assets in actually contributing to successfully hunting IEDs was 
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difficult to quantifiably measure. Current U.S. strategies used to counter insurgent 
activity, particularly IEDs, although well intended, have been reactive, defensive and 
dynamic. In an op-ed column titled, “IEDs: Combating Roadside Bombs,” Brigadier 
General Anthony Tata, Deputy Director for Operations, Joint Improvised Explosive 
Device Defeat Organization, explains the great difficulty in the efforts against IEDs. He 
opined, 
We have a major focus on attacking the IED networks underway. JIEDDO 
operates along three lines of operation: defeat the device; attack the 
networks; and train the force. Attacking the networks is where we see the 
biggest dividends in stopping the shipment, construction and emplacement 
of IEDs…Once coalition forces separate the enemy from the people, they 
bring in indigenous police forces to hold the security gains and then build 
trust and confidence as well as conduct reconstruction. We see tips go way 
up; we see bomb makers turned in; we see IED networks dissolve. There 
is no greater ambassador for the American people than a war-fighter on 
the ground interfacing with the local population; and that works. 98 
The main issue with insurgencies, as faced in Fallujah in April 2004, is separating 
civilians from “the enemy.” This is the same issue Gen. Tata speaks of. The problem with 
irregular warfare is that “…insurgents can infiltrate as civilians, no matter what screening 
processes the U.S. establishes.”99 Unless specific intelligence has been prepared to 
narrow the focus area and identifying the target beforehand, it will always be difficult to 
measure the effectiveness of persistent surveillance assets allocation for ambiguous target 
sets. But without a precise definition of how the concept is to be used, commanders, 
contractors and operators loosely tailored justification to have assets that provided 
persistent surveillance. The question is, at what cost and to whose benefit?   
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V. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
This chapter analyzes the evolution of the persistent surveillance concept based 
on the historical events discussed in the previous chapter and how the under-defined 
concept has impacted military acquisitions, planning and operations. As it is with all 
evolutionary processes, the use of persistent surveillance between 2003 and 2007 
experienced both effective and ineffective employment. The measurement of effective or 
ineffectiveness was based on the following criteria: 1) the environment the sensor 
platforms were used in (i.e., was it an optimal performance environment (weather, 
climate, operating altitude, degree of interoperability with other sensors); 2) the 
experience of the operators (i.e., had the operators using the intelligence gathered by 
persistent surveillance worked in the area being collected on before? Or was this the first 
time they were learning of the environment); and 3) the clarity of the use of persistent 
surveillance (i.e., how focused was the surveillance area? Narrow, broad, undefined?). 
This chapter also discusses the impact past and present use of the persistent surveillance 
concept may have on future defense decision makers and planners based on the historic 
facts outlined in this thesis. 
A. THE EFFECTIVENESS AND INEFFECTIVENESS OF PERSISTENT 
SURVEILLANCE 
The premise of insurgent warfare is the gradual inversion against traditional 
strengths of large armed forces from an advantage to a disadvantage.100 Guerrilla 
warfare, small wars, partisan wars, and low-intensity conflict have all been used to 
describe insurgency warfare of the past. Regardless of the warfare title, the underlying 
premise of such insurgent warfare has been the same: “warfare on the cheap.”101 Without 
a clear definition of such warfare there is no clear strategy or acquisition of the proper 
resources for the force to contend with such an adversary. According to retired Navy 
Captain Jeff Huber, 
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Our “Good War” military was suited to symmetrical enemies whose 
political behavior could be compelled by defeat of their armed forces. We 
haven’t had a foe like that since the Berlin Wall came down; arguably, the 
Soviets ceased to be a serious military threat years if not decades before 
then. Yet the preponderance of our defense budget is spent on gee-
wizardry to deter or fight a peer competitor that will never emerge. At the 
low-tech end of the spectrum, the Obama administration intends to 
continue increasing the size of our ground forces to conduct the “long 
war” against “radical extremists,” despite analysis by Rand Corporation 
that concludes the best way to proceed in our misnamed war on terror is 
“with a light U.S. military footprint or none at all.”102  
The author of Distant Thunder: Patterns of Conflict in the Developing World, 
Donald M. Snow, says the ability to define insurgency can allow the correct military 
means and political ends for which insurgent warfare is fought to be properly prescribed. 
He states, 
In terms of means, insurgency refers to how forces are used strategically 
and tactically in front of an enemy. As a strategy, it attempts to wear down 
and weaken a militarily superior foe over time. Its major goal, attrition, is 
accomplished by prolonging war and exhausting a less dedicated foe. 
Tactically, insurgency usually involved irregular, part-time, often non-
uniformed forces who employ such tactics as ambush, hit-and-run, and 
avoidance of contact where superiority at the point of engagement does 
not guarantee victory.103    
American forces for decades have organized for large-scale conventional operations 
against like adversaries. In conventional warfare, American forces have succeeded, but 
forces have experienced setbacks when up against insurgencies. Failures by American 
forces against insurgencies have been costly; costly not only in the number of service 
members’ lives lost, but also in resources and political influence.  
The U.S. defeat in Vietnam, embarrassing setbacks in Lebanon and 
Somalia, and continuing political and military difficulties in Afghanistan 
and especially Iraq underscore the limits of America's hard-won 
conventional military supremacy. That supremacy has not delivered 
decisive success against non-state enemies practicing protracted irregular  
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warfare; on the contrary, America's conventional supremacy and approach 
to war—especially its paramount reliance on firepower and technology—
are often counterproductive.104 
The reason why American forces have often been ineffective and counterproductive has 
been because U.S. forces are at an information disadvantage when fighting against 
insurgents. According to Naval Postgraduate School professor Gordon H. McCormick’s 
Systems Model of Insurgency,  
Insurgents begin with an overwhelming information advantage but a force 
disadvantage. Their primary concern must be to overcome the state’s force 
advantage. The counter insurgency begins with an overwhelming force 
advantage but an information disadvantage. Its efforts must focus on 
neutralizing the insurgents’ information advantage. The first side that 
overcomes its disadvantage wins.105 
As U.S. strategic planners focus countering the insurgent threat environment with 
a technologic fix to tip the insurgent information advantage, it may be that high-tech 
gadgetry may not produce a solution to the problem. But how does a technologically 
driven force begin to think that there could be something other than a high-tech answer? 
Such thinking would require an exhausting strategic paradigm shift within the 
Department of Defense (DoD); a paradigm shift requiring less emphasis on the 
acquisition and role of technologic hardware in executing warfare (i.e., missiles, fighter 
aircraft). 
This was apparent in a survey done in 2000 of some 1,900 officers attending U.S. 
professional military education that found that most U.S. military officers were 
“technological optimists.”106 Many of the officers surveyed believed advanced 
technology was essential to success. Officers who took the survey believed there was 
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correlation between operational success and the availability of technology for military 
operations. The survey conducted indicated three main beliefs of what technology 
offered: 1) technology was necessary in granting U.S. forces the advantage in engaging in 
high-intensity operations with substantially reduced risk of casualties; 2) having 
advanced technology would allow for a shortened duration of engagement in future 
conflicts; and 3) having advanced technology at the military’s disposal made it easier for 
the United States to use force to achieve decisive battlefield victories.107 Unfortunately, 
the officers failed to acknowledge the challenges of insurgent warfare and the events of 
September 11, 2001. 
Understanding the influence persistent surveillance had on decision makers to 
further employ the surveillance concept is one of the key elements to uncovering the 
conditions for which persistent surveillance was used throughout the four year span 
covered in this thesis.  
Historical analysis of effective and ineffective operations using persistent 
surveillance in Iraq between 2003 through 2005 and 2006 through 2007 reflected a shift 
in strategic usage of the surveillance concept. Operations using persistent surveillance in 
Iraq between 2003 through 2005 were conducted in a conventional fashion: surveillance 
was used to enhance pre-gathered intelligence against known targets, conducted by 
experienced operators in pre-coordinated operations. In contrast, following the 2006 
QDR call for persistent surveillance as “vital to mission success in Iraq,” persistent 
surveillance between 2006 and 2007 was used with little to no pre-gathered intelligence, 
had an increased role against unknown targets and appeared to be used more by 
inexperienced operators in ad hoc operations.  
Between 2003 and 2005, the rescue of Jessica Lynch, capture of Saddam Hussein 
and success of Operation Phantom Fury were all effective operations that used the 
persistent surveillance concept.  In all of these events, there were three consistent 
similarities between the operations: planners used persistent surveillance to validate 
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known intelligence; surveillance search areas were pre-defined based on a known target; 
and operators had previous experience using the surveillance concept. These operations 
set the groundwork for how persistent surveillance could be effectively used, but also 
showed other potentially larger uses.  Of course, there were also examples of failures 
during this time frame, such as operations in Fallujah in April 2004 that proved to be both 
a learning tool as well as a catalyst for increased persistent surveillance in the future. 
As discussed in Chapter III, the measurement of effective or ineffective was based 
on the following criteria: 1) the environment the sensor platforms were used in (i.e., was 
it an optimal performance environment (weather, climate, operating altitude, degree of 
interoperability with other sensors); 2) the experience of the operators (i.e., had the 
operators using the intelligence gathered by persistent surveillance worked in the area 
being collected on before? Or was this the first time they were learning of the 
environment); and 3) the clarity of the use of persistent surveillance (i.e., how focused 
was the surveillance area? Narrow, broad, undefined?).  
As the use of the surveillance concept began to be accepted by the general force, 
the request for assets that could perform persistent surveillance at both the tactical and 
strategic planning levels began to have a large impact on Department of Defense 
budgetary allocations and Congressional funding.  
At its inception as an operational goal when first introduced in the 2001 QDR, the 
under-defined persistent surveillance concept served as an additional tool for operators in 
obtaining information. What was unseen at the time was that the concept of persistent 
surveillance had the strength of becoming an organizational catalyst of change for how 
wars were to be fought. The magnitude of how much of an impact the persistent 
surveillance concept would actually have on military operations and planning was 
staggering.  According to organizational change theory, the evolution of the persistent 
surveillance concept began to take place as established military institutional standards of 
conventional warfare techniques (surveillance techniques and reporting procedures) 
began to lose their competitive advantage.108 Whereas the U.S. dominated in 
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conventional warfare, the insurgency that erupted in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 
exposed U.S. vulnerabilities that stunned decision makers, planners, and operators alike. 
The new surveillance assets and techniques delivered by the persistent surveillance 
concept, although under-defined on its usage, shed optimism in regaining the offensive 
advantage now taken by the enemy. It was a concept introduced at the right time, tested 
by choice, and proven through a combination of chance and calculated consequence. 
The operational effectiveness of persistent surveillance in the case of rescuing 
Private Lynch was possible due to several factors. First, the use of the surveillance asset 
was conducted in its most optimal performance capacity taking advantage of all facets 
such as weather and lighting. Second, the mission was a classic joint operations mission 
accomplished by some of the finest in the force, to include, Army Rangers, Air Force 
pilots and combat controllers, U.S. Marines, and Navy Seals.109 The operators were all 
experienced, having been properly trained and equipped for such missions and familiar 
with the search and rescue techniques and procedures. In other words, there was proper 
utilization of the persistent surveillance concept to accomplish their mission.  Finally, the 
asset was on target, at an arranged time, providing overview to specific consumers on a 
specific location.  Therefore, all three effective criteria were met. 
The use of persistent surveillance in the hunt for Saddam Hussein was another 
effective use of the concept. Considered to be the number one high value target in Iraq at 
the time, the operational effectiveness of persistent surveillance in this case was once 
again possible due to several factors. First, the surveillance assets, both human 
intelligence and aerial surveillance vehicles, were focused on a single target (thereby 
meeting the third criteria for effective use). This allowed for the forces searching for 
Saddam Hussein to have in their favor the availability of identifiable markings and 
understanding of his modus operandi (i.e., they knew what he looked liked and 
knowledge of his habits). This allowed for intensified persistent use of aerial surveillance 
to verify tips gathered by human intelligence assets for corroboration in a specific area 
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during the most optimal periods (i.e., the first criteria). Second, the mission was a classic 
joint operations mission accomplished by a large coalition force. The operators were 
experienced and had the benefit of both “black” and “white” world intelligence assets. 
Black world is the use of covert operatives and systems, such as the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s Task Force 121’s involvement in the hunt for Saddam. White world assets are 
conventional force assets. The availability to use both types of assets gave greater 
surveillance coverage and accuracy in achieving persistent coverage.  
These two monumental operational successes in 2003 boded well for the use of 
persistent surveillance and the concept picked up momentum as war tactics began to shift. 
Operation Phantom Fury also had the benefit of almost unlimited access and allocation to 
ISR assets for optimal sensor performance. Sensors used in Operation Phantom Fury had 
a high degree of fidelity with interoperability, allowing “direct feeds via satellite to 
command centers and selected forces on the ground opened up a full-motion video 
perspective on the street battle” near-real-time, all the time unbeknownst by insurgent 
forces.110 Coupled with experienced operators on the ground, a focused surveillance area 
with multiple assets to provide layered coverage, and a clearly defined operational 
objective, the use of the persistent surveillance concept was effective. 
B. INFLUENCE OF DECISION MAKING ON USING PERSISTENT 
SURVEILLANCE 
Leadership examined these successes and failures and now saw other, potentially 
greater (or so they hoped) uses for persistent surveillance.  In contrast to the 2003 to 2005 
time frame, the events analyzed between 2006 and 2007 had not emphasized a need to 
use the concept during optimum operating environments, with pre-coordinated planning 
by experienced operators, or used with specific target or surveillance areas identified 
prior to allocating assets. Rather, decision makers placed greater emphasis on the concept 
as providing the resource of persistent surveillance in an “on call” fashion to be used at 
the requester’s avail. It is during this time that the concept gained momentum as an axiom 
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for operational success against irregular warfare challenges, to include countering IEDs 
and hunting down insurgent networks, amongst the mainstream conventional force 
structure. Under this belief the use of persistent surveillance shifted from an operational 
goal to an operational concept that operators felt necessary to have at their tactical 
disposal. The catalyst for the shift stemmed from knowledge that the concept could 
achieve far greater insight into a possible “future” than the resources currently at hand. 
Although the “unblinking eye” is not capable of predicting adversary actions, GEOINT 
did lend the potential for the user to be better prepared for what was in their path, or 
forewarn of an adversary soon to be faced. 
The operators on the ground were desperately trying to take back a tactical 
advantage against a technologically disadvantaged adversary and hoped that persistent 
surveillance could provide the “edge.” Although technologically disadvantaged, the 
adversary continuously proved to have the offensive advantage, a fact that proved 
extremely frustrating. This fact, coupled with a lack of strategy amongst leadership to 
overcome such an enemy, raised the value of persistent surveillance assets for operators 
and how operations were planned.  
During conventional operations (i.e., warfare that consisted of good guys versus 
bad guys and a reason for hostilities), operational plans were made in advance. Strategic 
objectives began with proper training, while simultaneously resourcing the force with the 
right equipment to gain the offensive advantage against a known adversary. Such strategy 
becomes crippled when faced with the elements of irregular warfare. The challenge of 
irregular warfare begins with identifying the good and the bad guys amongst the 
population Next comes the understanding of the adversary’s operational intent (i.e., why, 
how and where are they operating out of and against whom with what).  This information 
ultimately leads to locating and neutralizing the adversary.  Persistent surveillance, if 
utilized properly, can fill in any missing gaps and aid in mitigating these challenges. 
The use of persistent surveillance has been very effective when integrated with 
forces in conventional operations. However, the effectiveness of the persistent 
surveillance concept when used solely for gaining actionable intelligence in irregular 
warfare scenarios is still difficult to assess. The surveillance is believed to provide a 
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sense of security for leadership and forces operating in dynamic environments, such as 
irregular warfare. The question is to what end will forces depend on persistent 
surveillance in providing information that leads them to achieving the real security they 
actually seek? Persistent surveillance is clearly a valuable asset on today’s battlefields.  
However, the question remains, how is persistent surveillance best used in current and 
future operations? At this point, the individual services once again decide to split in not 
only how persistent surveillance is viewed, but how it should be used. This leads to yet 
another question, “Does the future hold an agreed upon definition and concept of 
operation?” 
C. THE FUTURE OF PERSISTENT SURVEILLANCE IN THE 2010 QDR 
Whereas the 2001 QDR introduced persistent surveillance as a potential 
operational goal and the 2006 QDR fully declared persistent surveillance as an invaluable 
operational capability vital to mission success in the war in Iraq, what might the 2010 
QDR say about the use of persistent surveillance? As the purpose of the QDR is to shape 
the Department of Defense’s plans, policies, and programs into a broader strategy, which 
will then find its way into the Presidential budget request, there is no better time than 
now to fully define what persistent surveillance should be and how it should be allocated. 
Is persistent surveillance a true ISR asset? Or can forces have the persistent surveillance 
capability in order to provide tactical situational awareness without any “intelligence” 
attached? 
The historical analysis of persistent surveillance conducted in this thesis implies 
future employment of persistent surveillance will have large budgetary consequences if 
the concept is not fully defined, its use is not clearly stated in doctrine, and qualitative 
metrics of effectiveness are not incorporated into U.S. joint warfare. 
The concern of implications that stem from an under-defined and loosely justified 
persistent surveillance concept is illustrated in the debate of using the concept as a means 
to gain the offensive advantage against the insurgency in Afghanistan, where the three 
factors of effective usage of the persistent surveillance are less likely to be present. 
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Commander of U.S. Central Command has made clear acknowledgement that the 
successful counterinsurgency strategies of Iraq will not work in Afghanistan.111 Without 
any clear delineation of usage, the Army has continued to go forward independently in 
providing persistent surveillance capability to ground commanders. Modeled after the TF 
ODIN initiative in Iraq, the Army was said to employ TF ODIN-A, giving lower-ranking 
tactical commanders the real-time persistent surveillance typically reserved for senior 
leadership and strategic decision makers in Afghanistan.112 Although classification has 
hindered verification of such employment, Defense Secretary Gates was believed to be 
all for it. The Wall Street Journal reported that, 
The expansion of the program into Afghanistan hasn't been formally 
announced, but Defense Secretary Robert Gates alluded to the plan during 
a congressional hearing last week. Mr. Gates told lawmakers from the 
House Armed Services Committee that he was going to "re-create" the 
Iraq effort and "replicate it in Afghanistan with additional assets."113 
But it’s just not the Army fighting in Afghanistan. What assets are Marines, Air Force 
and coalition partners using? Are the systems interoperable? How much is each sortie 
costing? And if units are working “jointly,” whose asset gets used and who foots the bill? 
Whether a newly formed Task Force ODIN can pull off the same feat 
when it begins arriving in Afghanistan in 2009 remains an open question. 
Afghanistan’s mountainous terrain, extreme weather conditions and a 
comparatively weak U.S. and NATO communications infrastructure will 
be obstacles. In addition, the tactics of Afghan enemy forces have differed 
from the urban battle of pacification in Iraq, with Taliban fighters actively 
engaging U.S. and coalition troops in firefights and then disappearing into 
mountainous hideouts. Rather than taking the exact blueprint… in Iraq and 
putting it in Afghanistan, you’ve got to tailor it for that environment…114 
Unless specific intelligence has been prepared to narrow the focus area and 
identifying the target beforehand, it will always be difficult to measure the effectiveness 
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of persistent surveillance assets allocation for ambiguous target sets. JIEDDO has yet to 
verifiably prove with quantitative data the effectiveness of using persistent surveillance 
techniques to find IEDs against the total amount of time, money, and manpower spent in 
the total of missions the concept was employed in. Of how many total missions were the 
surveillance assets allocated and used in? How much did each mission’s loiter over 
surveillance area cost? These are the real questions and the implications. Such concern 
was highlighted in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 Senate 
report. The report states, 
The committee continues to be concerned that the Department cannot 
adequately oversee JIEDDO's budget, manpower, and activities in a 
manner that ensures the most efficient and effective delivery of equipment 
and capabilities to U.S. forces. The committee urges that the Department 
consider reexamining JIEDDO's oversight structure to determine whether 
a principal staff assistant could devote time and attention to JIEDDO's 
activities commensurate with the size of its activities.115 
Furthermore: 
As noted elsewhere in this report, the Secretary of Defense has stated in 
testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on 
Defense, that the ISR task force should be phased out, while at the same 
time, the Department has decided to institutionalize JIEDDO. Just as the 
committee is concerned about the possible hasty demise of the ISR task 
force, so too the committee is concerned about the premature decision to 
make JIEDDO permanent. The committee urges the Department to clarify 
the criteria it is using to determine which institutions should become 
permanent and which should not, and to demonstrate how these criteria are 
being consistently applied across organizations.116 
For all these reasons, and many more involving the acquisition of newly fielded 
assets to provide persistent surveillance, are all the more reasons why a clear definition of 
persistent surveillance must be made by joint share holders.  
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Under the current definitions, persistent surveillance has a different meaning 
throughout the DoD. For the U.S. Strategic Command persistent surveillance is defined 
as: 
the integrated management of a diverse set of collection and processing 
capabilities, operated to detect and understand the activity of interest with 
sufficient sensor dwell, revisit rate and required quality to expeditiously 
assess adversary actions, predict adversary plans, deny sanctuary to an 
adversary, and assess results of U.S./coalition” actions.117 
The Joint Intelligence 2–0 publication defines persistent surveillance not as an integrated 
management of collection capabilities, but rather a collection strategy. The publication 
calls persistent surveillance a: 
collection strategy that emphasizes the ability of some collection systems 
to linger on demand in an area to detect, locate, characterize, identify, 
track, target, and possibly provide battle damage assessment and re-
targeting in real or near real time. Persistent surveillance facilitates the 
formulation and execution of preemptive activities to deter or forestall 
anticipated adversary course of action.118 
While the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), like the Joint Intelligence 
publication, also defines persistent surveillance as a collection strategy, JFCOM 
specifically states that persistent surveillance is capable of using the “full range” of 
collection platforms. JFCOM defines persistent surveillance this way: 
a collection strategy that uses a full range of strategic, operational, and 
tactical collection systems to dwell on and revisit a target in order to 
detect, locate, characterize, identify,  track, target and assess desired 
effects. Persistent surveillance contributes to the detection and recognition 
of meaningful changes in an adversary’s activities that support planning 
and executing preemptive actions to prevent likely adversary courses of 
action.119 
Defining persistent surveillance as a collection strategy using the “full range of strategic, 
operational, and tactical collection systems” allows justification for conventional military 
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planners to incorporate national reconnaissance systems, typically reserved for strategic 
planners at the highest levels of U.S. decision makers, for tactical operations. 
All the definitions above lack three basic elements found to be key with using 
persistent surveillance: the use of persistent surveillance to further investigate a known 
target; a set limit to loiter time for the assets; and set parameters of the area in which the 
surveillance should be used in. Without these, each definition allows the use of persistent 
surveillance to be left up to interpretation of the element using it. Ultimately, without a 
clear and precise definition of how persistent surveillance should be used, the vicious 
cycle of mismanaged resources will continue. 
However, the 2010 QDR has an opportunity to slow down, and possibly even 
stop, this vicious cycle from continuing. If the 2010 QDR is geared to drive future 
acquisitions to counter future threats, then the Department of Defense must clarify the use 
of persistent surveillance. Therefore, for proper use of the concept, the definition should 
be precise and leave decision makers and planners little room for misinterpretation as to 
what justifies the request, acquisition, application, and employment of persistent 
surveillance. Decision makers and planners must know the consequences of 
mismanagement and concept misapplication.  In addition, standards with quantifiable 
assessments, that measure the effectiveness of the surveillance concept, should be created 
and applied amongst all services.   
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Historical analysis showed the persistent surveillance concept is useful for 
missions where objectives are clear; the concept is incorporated in the pre-planning 
stages of operations; and experienced operators use the products of persistent 
surveillance. Although many would like to believe the surveillance concept is a cure all, 
or a panopticon that achieves success in gaining the information advantage necessary to 
defeat the enemy in every operation the concept is employed in, the fact is it is not.  
While this thesis does not propose a precise definition for persistent surveillance, 
it does highlight the damage an undefined concept can make if left to interpretation. This 
thesis proposed that the Department of Defense create a clear definition that identifies 
how, when, and to what extent persistent surveillance should be used. Specifically the 
definition should identify loiter time, surveillance area parameters and how the concept’s 
effectiveness is to be assessed. Without an accepted and clearly defined use of persistent 
surveillance in today’s joint warfare documents, decision makers and planners are 
allowed to interpret the concept loosely, justifying the concept’s use as each of the armed 
services sees fit to respond to the needs of their warfighter. Without a collective joint 
effort, the increased use of this under-defined surveillance concept fuels the vicious cycle 
of mismanagement—wasting valuable resource of time, money and manpower. 
As the conflict in Iraq shifted from conventional battle to stability operations, 
there was an increased call for more persistent surveillance. Each of the armed services 
began to independently advocate the need for persistent surveillance. Under the 
perception the Air Force was not sufficiently allocating enough surveillance assets, the 
Army and the Marine Corps began seeking alternative means to gain persistent 
surveillance. As IEDs became the number one cause of force casualties in Iraq, the hunt 
for IEDs soon became the number one reason why persistent surveillance should be 
granted to tactical units. And with such pursuit, so began the debate of how viable 
persistent surveillance was to operations.  
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Part of the driving factor that warrants the increased need for persistent 
surveillance is the American reliance on technology for answers. When the 
technologically-dominant U.S. military found itself at the mercy of an adversary that used 
handmade improvised explosive devices to successfully gain the offensive advantage, the 
U.S. government was quick to codify the use of persistent surveillance into operations as 
the “technological fix” needed to tip the scale.  
However, the lack of a clear definition of persistent surveillance may have tipped 
the scale to the adversary’s advantage to an even greater degree as our nation continues to 
contribute millions of dollars to a “technological fix” that may not be warranted in 
missions where it is currently being applied. Threats of today and of tomorrow require 
much more than technologically advanced weapons and much more “sensing” than any 
technologic surveillance techniques will ever be able to provide.  
While there are those who characterize technology as not making much 
difference relative to the human dimension of warfare, the truth is that the 
appropriate mix of both is what has given U.S. joint forces critical 
advantage in warfare.120 
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